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Abstract 
Questions concerning the way in which digital games produce meaning and the 
possibility that their reconfigurability influences the process of interpretation have 
been debated since the very beginning of contemporary game studies. Based on 
general agreement between scholars, two areas of inquiry have been distinguished: 
the story produced by a game, and game mechanics, or rather all the information 
necessary to operate within them. The so-called “Game vs. Story division” has been 
analysed from multiple perspectives and theoretical standpoints1. Among the 
scholars adopting the hermeneutical angle, there seems to be a consensus regarding 
the two distinct interpretative processes that occur while a game is played, although 
they do not agree about which should be considered the primary one. Scholars 
arguing for the unique character of digital games tend to focus on the interpretation 
created while the game is played that relates to aspects of gameplay. They stress the 
importance of so-called “real-time hermeneutics”, as this is unprecedented in other 
media.2 In turn, researchers questioning the specificity of games as a medium claim 
that a proper interpretation should concern itself with the stories produced through 
playing, rendering such interpretation similar to every other hermeneutical process. 
Therefore, the process of understanding a game could be explained within the 
                                                          
1 See Kapell, Matthew Wilhelm (ed). The Play Versus Story Divide in Game Studies: Critical Essays. 
(Jefferson, NC: McFarland) (2015). 
2 Aarseth Espen, “Playing Research: Methodological Approaches to Game Analysis” in Proceedings 
of the Digital Arts and Culture Conference (2003), 
http://www.bendevane.com/VTA2012/herrstubbz/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/02.GameApproaches2.pdf. 2003, date accessed 23 September 2017;  
Arjoranta Jonne, Real-Time Hermeneutics: Meaning-Making in Ludonarrative Digital Games. (Jyväskylä: 
University of Jyväskylä) (2015); Leino Olli Tapio, “Death loop as a feature” Game Studies 12:2 
(2012); Karhulahti Veli-Matti, “Double Fine Adventure and the Double Hermeneutic 
Videogame” in Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Fun and Games (2012). 
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existing hermeneutical framework without any need to introduce media-specific 
interventions3. 
In this paper, I will investigate the process of understanding video games, following 
the detailed, step-by-step description of interpretation provided by Paul Ricoeur in 
his American lectures4. In doing so, I will supplement the concept of “real life 
hermeneutics”5 by narrowing the gap between interpreting game stories and 
gameplay situations. While such a perspective will bring me closer to a stance which 
denies any specificity to video games (at least regarding interpretation), I will also 
describe the key difference between understanding a video game and a traditional 
text, and briefly point towards its possible consequences, building upon Charles 
Taylor’s concept of ethics of authenticity6. 
Key words: hermeneutics, video games, Ricoeur 
 
Ludo-hermeneutics, or How to Understand a Video Game 
 
The difference between literary and game hermeneutics has been analysed by game 
scholars ever since Markku Eskelinen observed that “in art we might have to 
configure in order to be able to interpret whereas in games we have to interpret in 
order to be able to configure”7; this quote was later repeated in Espen Aarseth’s 
seminal paper on methodology of game studies8. In said paper, Aarseth introduced 
the concept of “real-time hermeneutics” based on the assumption that the key 
difference between the interpretation of a traditional text and that of a video game 
lies in the reflexivity of the former and the responsiveness of the latter. In other 
words, when confronted with a non-game textual object the reader perceives it as a 
whole and creates her interpretation at a pace that she, and only she, sets. The player 
needs to constantly adjust her interpretation, as the unstable environment of the 
game changes in response to her actions, undertaken as a result of said interpretation. 
Therefore, Aarseth claims that to play a game, the player needs to employ a skillset 
entirely different from the tools of the traditional textual interpretation. The process 
exposes the major dissimilarity between games and other media: “While the 
interpretation of a literary or filmic work will require certain analytical skills, the game 
requires analysis practiced as performance, with direct feedback from the system. 
                                                          
3 Kłosiński, Michał, „W stronę hermeneutyki gier komputerowych.” in Teksty Drugie 165:3 
(2017), Kochanowicz, P.  „Cybernetyczne doświadczenia”–fabularyzowane gry komputerowe w 
perspektywie hermeneutyki.” in Homo Ludens 5:1 (2013). 
4 Ricoeur Paul, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Wort, TX: TCU Press) 
(1976). 
5 Aarseth 2003; Arjoranta 2015. 
6 Taylor Charles, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press) (1992). 
7 Eskelinen Markku, “The Gaming Situation”, Game Studies 1:1 (2001). 
8 Aarseth 2003. 
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This is a dynamic, real-time hermeneutics that lacks a corresponding structure in film 
or literature”.9 
The difference described by Aarseth was subsequently recognized as one of the 
defining qualities of a video game as a cultural object. As Jonne Arjoranta claims10, 
such a concept is crucial for both the proceduralist school of game analysis and for 
any scholarly attempt to create “game hermeneutics”. As far as the former is 
concerned, the interactive qualities of video games allow for a way of making 
arguments and expressing ideas with processes11. The latter needs to incorporate 
reconfigurative properties of games into the hermeneutical project. Arjoranta himself 
combines proceduralist arguments with a rich analysis of various temporal layers of 
the game, differentiating between the player’s made-on-the-fly interpretation and the 
understanding of the complete game as a cultural object12. The latter is always 
incomplete and indefinite, enriched by the passage of time, as it is governed by 
general rules of meaning-making as described by Hans-Georg Gadamer, and does 
not differentiate from any other interpretative effort. The former’s peculiar quality is 
the fact that it can be actively resisted by the game itself: “For example, if one 
interprets the Koopa Troopa turtles in Super Mario Bros. (Nintendo Creative 
Department 1985) as friendly and tries to hug them, it will probably result in the 
plumber-protagonist Mario losing his life. In this case, we can say that it is the wrong 
interpretation to make”.13  
Velli-Matti Karhulahti’s “double hermeneutic circle” concept employs similar 
reasoning, using the Giddensian concept of double-hermeneutics as a point of 
departure14. Accordingly, to properly describe the process of meaning-making in 
video games, one needs to acknowledge this crucial fact: the very act of 
understanding leads to changes in the matter one is trying to interpret (as is true in 
social science analysis, according to Giddens). During play, there are two constant 
moves within two hermeneutic circles: the first is ludic-oriented, aiming to actively 
change the game in order to progress; the second is aesthetic and allows the game to 
be comprehended as a narrative, or, more broadly, as a text. The former is time-
sensitive and sometimes resisted by the game, the latter is more reflexive and 
indefinite, as it is not rooted solemnly in the game system and is more open to 
traditional meaning-making procedures.  
Olli Tapio Leino identifies two hermeneutical modes on the basis of game 
materiality. Every player produces her own idiosyncratic interpretation of aesthetical 
                                                          
9 Aarseth 2003, p. 5. 
10 Arjoranta 2015. 
11 Bogost Ian, “Process vs. Procedure” in The Fourth International Conference of the Whitehead Research 
Project Metaphysics Things New Forms of Speculative Thought (2010) 
http://bogost.com/downloads/Bogost - Process vs. Procedure.pdf, date accessed 23 September 
2017. 
12 Arjoranta 2015, p. 59–60. 
13 Arjoranta 2011, p. 6. 
14 Karhulahti 2012. 
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elements of the game world and story, and although such an interpretation is critical 
for an individual player’s enjoyment, in order to properly understand the character 
of the game object (dubbed “playable artefact” by Leino), it is necessary to 
distinguish between what is idiosyncratic and intersubjective, as “intersubjective 
interpretations are those that the materiality of the artefact forces upon its players, 
i.e., on those whose desire to play is strong enough to survive the resistance with 
which the game artefact counters the project of playing".15 
While Rafał Kochanowicz follows the practice of distinguishing between two 
hermeneutical practices in playing a game, his analysis is built upon Ricoeur’s 
distinction between hermeneutics of faith and hermeneutics of suspicion. He moves 
past the play–story divide, arguing that the game is perceived in its totality, and the 
player chooses whether she follows the rules and submits to the regime of the 
gameplay, thus showing faith in the game’s meanings, or if she tries to resist and 
defeat the game, especially when confronted with morally charged decisions. 
Although such a perspective seems to provide an alternative to the story–game 
divide, it also strongly suggests that game hermeneutics of suspicion are related to 
the player’s agency, and the hermeneutics of faith to the lack thereof, therefore 
actually contributing to the existing divide.16 
The hermeneutical project developed by Michał Kłosiński, although framed as a 
polemic with Arjoranta and Karhulahti, is built on a very similar preconception of a 
division between the game and the story. Moreover, the Polish author agrees with 
Arjoranta that interpretations of game stories can and should be analysed with the 
existing hermeneutic tools. Yet, he rejects the idea of game-related meaning-making, 
arguing after Gadamer that the game is a phenomenon entirely independent of the 
player. Reconfigurable elements of the game contribute to the interpretation, as they 
belong to the narrative in a fashion similar to any interpretation, being a 
recombination of how reality is perceived and understood. As a result, Kłosiński 
shifts his interest from the way the game produces meaning and in which it can be 
understood to analysis of the game as a tool to understand the world and gain self-
knowledge17. 
 
Interpretation of In-Game Obstacles 
 
Despite their differences, all the aforementioned propositions share the same 
conviction: when interacting with the game, the player needs to understand her 
situation based on textual clues the game provides, kinaesthetic directions given by 
the interface, and her own understanding of the media and the genre. Her task is to 
                                                          
15 Leino 2012. 
16 Kochanowicz 2013. 
17 Kłosiński 2017. 
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come up with a suitable solution to the problem at hand and employ it, to overcome 
the obstacle and to progress with the game. Whether the described situation 
broadens or narrows the margin of freedom the player has, in contrast to the reader 
of traditional texts, or if said situation is related to the overall interpretation of the 
game as an aesthetic object and to the player’s self-knowledge, is subject to debate18. 
I shall illustrate this basic interpretative procedure with an example I have already 
analysed elsewhere in greater detail19. In the game Rise of the Argonauts (Liquid 
Entertainment 2008), a lesser-known, ugly cousin of Sony’s God of War (SCE Studios 
Santa Monica 2005), I, as the player, am taking on the role of Jason of Iolcos, captain 
of Argo, in his quest for the Golden Fleece. During the game, I can interact with the 
environment and talk to friendly NPCs, choosing dialogue lines, but my task is to 
battle hordes of enemies. During combat, I have to choose between three weapons 
to hurt the opponents most efficiently. To do so, I need to understand the relations 
between weaponry and various categories of enemies.  
Luckily, beside the trial-and-error method, I have more tools in my interpretative 
toolbox. I can conjure classic tradition and relate the game’s usage of weaponry to 
the description of arms in the source material, namely Greek mythology. I also have 
my experience with the genre conventions of video games and, more broadly, general 
knowledge on how melee combat is usually portrayed in Western culture. All this, 
combined with my former experiences with the game itself, helps me understand that 
a sword is useless against a heavily armoured foe, and agile opponents can easily 
avoid my mighty mace. It does not matter whether my pre-knowledge originates 
from the duel between Menelaus and Paris in Book 3 of Iliad, years of playing 
Dungeons & Dragons, or the repetitiveness of the game itself. Based on clues given by 
the game, I have to formulate—sometimes very quickly—a hypothesis about the best 
course of action. Then, my reasoning is confronted with some resistance, and I can 
measure its validity on the basis of my performance. If my Jason has been slain, it is 
time to formulate a new interpretation. Again, it is irrelevant whether the failure 
originates in the enemy’s resistance to the chosen weapon or in my inability to deliver 
attacks: if I have died, it is time to figure out another course of action. 
This example, even if crude, seems to confirm the previously described views on 
game hermeneutics. My experience playing Rise of the Argonauts confirms that the 
game resists an invalid interpretation, as described by Arjoranta, and there is constant 
interaction between the game system and the aesthetic background of the narrative, 
constituting Karhulahti’s double hermeneutic circle and contributing to Leino’s 
intersubjective interpretation. But there are still questions which remain unanswered: 
is the act of choosing a weapon somehow related to the overall interpretation of the 
game? Does the skillset required to understand my situation within the game differ 
from the one required in literary or film interpretation? And is this brief situation an 
                                                          
18 Karhulahti 2012, p. 7. 
19 Majkowski, Tomasz Z, “Złote Runo. Gra Wideo Jako Doświadczenie Interpretacyjne.” in 
Olbrzym w Cieniu. Gry wideo w kulturze audiowizualnej, edited by Andrzej Pitrus, (Kraków: WUJ) 
(2012b). 
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interpretation at all, or just an element of the game performance, deprived of any 
deeper meaning that can be fished out during the hermeneutic process?20  
Although the reader of a traditional book is very rarely confronted with a similar 
choice when she follows a linear narrative, on the very basic level of interpretation, 
there is no difference between the player and the reader: they both assume that “there 
is more”, and they need to overcome an obstacle to reveal a previously unknown 
part of the text. Despite all the differences in the very nature of said surplus and in 
the tools employed to overcome the obstacle, for both the reconfigurable and the 
static form the first interpretative move is quite similar: it begins with a guess. 
 
Validation of Hypothesis 
 
Such a situation of both the player and the reader seems to be in line with the earliest 
stages of interpretation, as understood by Paul Ricoeur21. In his detailed description 
of the hermeneutic process, Ricoeur opposed the concept that a text can only be 
interpreted once it has been read in its entirety—the notion that traditional textual 
hermeneutics was built upon. Instead, he describes acts of reading and interpreting 
as inseparable: the reader constantly makes guesses about the meaning of the part 
she just finished in light of her knowledge of the book, the literary genre, the general 
education, and so forth22. The most basic example of such a guess would be asking 
the question “what will happen next?” In fact, there are whole genres based on the 
audience’s ability to make interpretations on the fly: without it, the crime story would 
be impossible. 
Such a stance matches the concept of “real time hermeneutics”, or the time-sensitive 
aspect of Karhulahti’s proposal. Although the act of playing differs from the act of 
reading, the meaning-making part seems quite similar. When moving through a 
literary text, several interpretative guesses can also only be made in a specific 
moment—this is especially true for popular narratives with high shock value. The 
pleasure of making such guesses seems to underline the very pervasive fear of 
obtaining important information about the plot ahead of time, from a source 
different than the text itself—a procedure appropriately called “spoiling”. My 
pleasure in battling various opponents in Rise of the Argonauts was very similar: only at 
certain points of the game could I make new hypotheses about the best course of 
combat and put them to test to see if my guess was right. 
The second part of the process hinted at in the previous sentence describes the 
necessary component of making a proper interpretation, which according to Paul 
                                                          
20 Kirkpatrick Graeme, Aesthetic Theory and the Video Game. (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press) (2011); Kłosiński 2017. 
21 Ricoeur 1976. 
22 Ricoeur 1976, p. 75–78. 
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Ricoeur is the act of validation23. Through various means, the reader checks if her 
guess was correct. If she was mistaken, she can alter her hypothesis and proceed with 
reading. If she was correct, she can add another part to the growing understanding 
of the text. Here, another strong analogy emerges: in light of Ricouerian theory, 
Arjoranta’s claim that video games are the only texts capable of resisting 
interpretation seems untrue. When taking into consideration the basic form of 
meaning-making described above, detective fiction can render the reader’s guess 
invalid by proving beyond doubt that the character suspected of being the murderer 
is in fact innocent. In another famous example, the idea of Ned Stark being the 
protagonist of George R. R. Martin’s fantasy saga The Song of Fire and Ice24—a 
conviction very firmly rooted in genre conventions—is invalidated with the swing of 
the sword that takes off the character’s head at the end of the first novel. The sudden 
conclusion of Stark’s storyline has forced many readers to re-formulate their 
interpretations of said book saga. 
In digital games, the described procedure of verifying an interpretative guess can be 
tied to the narrative unfolding as the player progresses. The narrative is usually 
presented in a linear manner, even if a story itself has many variants, and is depicted 
using cinematic or textual information; therefore, it is no different from watching a 
movie or reading a book, as Arjoranta and Kłosiński claim. This resistance that the 
games offer seems no different on a purely interpretative level25: in the cases of both 
games and literature, the player/reader needs to conjure her prior knowledge, add it 
to her ongoing interpretation made so far, and proceed accordingly. There is no 
difference in recognizing the antagonist within the story and on the level of gameplay: 
in both cases the projected course of the narrative includes either the protagonist’s 
triumph over the villain, or their defeat. This seems to be true for every game in 
which the category of an antagonist exists: even in the Civilization series (MPS Labs, 
1991 and subsequent), one needs to build a strategy on the assumption that Ghandi 
is either a trustworthy ally or a nuke-obsessed warmonger.  
Nonetheless, it is important to stress that the aforementioned similarities do not 
equate video games to literature or cinema: the way of engagement and interaction is 
quite different for all these forms, and all the reconfigurable qualities of games still 
differentiate them from other media. My claim concerns only the parallel in the act 
of understanding the situation, as the basis of game hermeneutics, and that claim 
seems to be—so far—quite defensible. The main difference is in quantity, not in 
quality, as games challenge players’ guesses more often. The very basic mechanism 
                                                          
23 Ricoeur 1976, p. 78–80. 
24 Martin George R. R, A Game of Thrones (New York: Bantam Spectra) (1996) and subsequent. 
25 There is an additional level of resistance offered by obstacles presented by the game. But 
overcoming said obstacles is not always related to the process of interpretation and usually relies 
on the dexterity or perceptiveness of the player and therefore cannot be treated as parts of 
interpretation. To put it simply: as Jason, sometimes I lose fights because I do not understand 
how to defeat my enemy (which provides the resistance to the game interpretation), and other 
times I am just clumsy with the controller. 
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of sense-making seems to be quite similar in games and other narrative-driven media: 
it is based on validation of interpretative guesses—the dialectics described by Ricoeur 
as his version of the hermeneutic circle.26 This, however, is also the point at which 
things get complicated: even if games and texts share the procedure of guessing, the 
validation seems to be different. 
 
From Validation to Appropriation 
 
To describe the other half of his circle, Ricoeur stresses the similarities between 
interpersonal and literary communication. In conversation, the process of validation 
can be done on the spot: if one participant is uncertain of the meaning, she can always 
ask her interlocutor to elaborate or explain. When words are put on paper, the reader 
has no such luxury, and if the text does not address her doubts directly—as in the 
case of crime fiction, a genre sometimes called “a game”27—she is at a loss. She can 
approximate the meaning by employing the validating techniques Ricoeur describes. 
But, in the end, she can never be certain, and this doubt opens up the very possibility 
of interpretation, understood as a search for non-literal, deeper meaning—the next 
part of the Ricouerian hermeneutic process. After the reading is done, the reader can 
explain the meaning of the text as a whole, based on her previously validated guesses. 
This interpretation can be therefore comprehended by establishing some relation 
between the text and the world: as Ricoeur expresses it, “discourse cannot fail to be 
about something.”28 If the point of reference is made, the reader is assured in the 
validity of the interpretation, and she can start the last, and the most crucial, part of 
the process, which the French hermeneutist calls “appropriation”: here, the reader 
finds out how the meaning of the text relates directly to her. This act can lead to self-
discovery and enrichment of the reader’s identity, and discovering oneself through 
texts is one of the ultimate goals of interpretation in Ricoeur’s philosophy29. 
Of course, not every literary text invokes such a long and complex process. The pre-
condition is to leave the reader in doubt when the reading is finished. This is why 
between a poem and a popular novel that answers every question and plainly explains 
its references, the latter is less likely to transform the very identity of the reader—at 
least from the Ricoeurian perspective. 
In the case of video games, the process of validation seems to lean towards a 
straightforward explanation, characteristic of live conversation. The interactivity, 
understood as the way in which the player and the game communicate with each 
                                                          
26 Ricoeur 1976, p. 79. 
27 Caillois Roger, The Mystery Novel (Bronxville: Laughing Buddha Press) (1984). 
28 Ricoeur 1976, p. 36. 
29 Ricoeur Paul, From Text to Action (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press) (2007). 
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other in order to force some kind of reaction30, tends to turn the dialectics of guessing 
and validation into a series of yes-or-no questions. This used to be quite a spectacular 
aspect of playing the point and click adventure games of old: if at a loss, the player 
would try to click on every object and command at her disposal. This was, of course, 
an act of desperation, undertaken after exhausting all the options the player could 
come up with based on their interpretation thus far. For example, distracting the troll 
by throwing him a red herring in The Secret of Monkey Island (LucasFilm Games 1990) 
was beyond the scope of possible interpretations made by a teenager with limited 
knowledge of English idioms (such as myself at the time). Before I discovered the 
solution through trial and error, I had tried to attack the guardian with my cutlass, 
bribe him with alcohol, sneak around him—yet all the options I considered sound 
were rejected by the game. 
The above example is extreme, but it illustrates three important characteristics of 
validating an interpretative guess in a video game. Firstly, there is a mechanism in 
place aimed at blocking some ideas, and sometimes rating the feasible ones as more 
or less correct by assigning them point value, differentiating the difficulty of 
employment, and so on. Secondly, the game forces the responsibility to progress the 
narrative on the player, while simultaneously refusing her the degree of control the 
reader usually has. Although sometimes the player can decide which way or in what 
order the story should progress, or she can even disregard the story entirely—the 
possibility Espen Aarseth identifies as the player’s freedom31—she cannot skip the 
uninteresting parts of the game to reach the juicy ones faster, or to metaphorically 
peek at the last page. Thirdly, despite the perceived freedom, authorial intent seems 
to be more important in games than in literature or cinema: it is significantly harder 
to create a functional interpretation which is not in accordance with it, as only choices 
perceived as valid are permitted by the authors. In my Secret of Monkey Island example, 
I had to abandon my reasoning completely to progress the game, just as Ron Gilbert, 
Tim Schafer and Dave Grossman intended. 
The conclusion so far is that although the beginning of the meaning-making process 
is very similar in video games and traditional narratives—at least according to 
hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur—the way of validating the interpretation shows several 
differences. In games it is more definitive, as it can deny the player progression and 
is much more frequent. This frequency is not without consequence: as Karhulahi 
observes,32 it can lead to a very goal-oriented reading of a game in which the 
interpretative effort is subordinated to the need to overcome obstacles. Such an 
attitude results in fragmentation of the understanding: there is no need to produce a 
coherent interpretation of the game as it demands an immediate, local interpretation 
aimed at solving a puzzle at hand. As a result, difficulties may emerge with regard to 
                                                          
30 Arjoranta Jonne, “Do We Need Real-Time Hermeneutics? Structures of Meaning in Games.” 
in DiGRA 2011: Think Design Play (2011), http://www.digra.org/wp-content/uploads/digital-
library/11310.17396.pdf, date accessed 23 September 2017. 
31 Aarseth 2003. 
32 Karhulahti 2012. 
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following the details of the game story or connecting the transaction of the avatar’s 
achievements to the overall narrative.  
The difference between games and other media is very clear when one compares a 
fragmented interpretation of a game with crime fiction, the most game-like genre. In 
both cases, there is a constant need to validate the interpretation in light of new facts 
and situations. Yet, in a detective story each revision adds to the overall 
understanding of the plot: if the prime suspect turns out to be innocent, the reader 
needs to go back and revise her understanding of the plot as a whole. In games, there 
is no such need as validation usually relates to a particular situation. When I discover 
a new way of dispatching enemies in the game I am playing, there is no need to go 
back and create a new interpretation in which the protagonist struggled with his 
combat inefficiencies until he discovered a new, better fighting technique. Such a 
move is replaced with a simple recognition: from now on, I, the player, know a better 
way to play my game. Of course, the aforementioned revision is entirely possible, 
though it is simply unnecessary to make sense of the game—the quality that leads to 
the separation of ludic and aesthetic hermeneutics in various theories33. However, 
my claim is that there is no separation in meaning-making procedures between the 
ludic and the aesthetic, and the perceived division comes from a very visible, present, 
and pleasurable validating mechanism. The reduced need for coherent interpretation 
is a result of hastened fulfilment: contrary to crime fiction, the player does not need 
to wait until the end to know if she understands the game correctly as it constantly 
delivers her ways to validate her skill in interpretation. From the hermeneutic point 
of view, a video game can be perceived as a machine to deliver recognition and 
reward for interpretative competence. 
The preoccupation with validation and the definitive nature of the process lead to 
further dissimilarity between video games and literary hermeneutics, namely, a 
diminishing need for explanation and for undertaking the subsequent steps. As stated 
before, the work of an interpretation in Ricoeur’s theory is not done when the book 
is finished—there is always doubt if one has understood it correctly. As a result, no 
interpretation is definite and closed; it can always be compared to other 
interpretations, rooted in experiences, knowledge and needs of different readers. 
This purely reflexive part of interpretation somehow seems to be blocked by video 
game mechanisms—if the player successfully reaches the end, it means she 
understood everything correctly. The need to find a point of reference for the text is 
also diminished, as complex video games pride themselves on accurately simulating 
the world. In order to go further with the interpretation, one has to suppress the 
claim that the game’s validating mechanism is definitive. A coherent interpretation 
needs to be deprived of “gameness”, understood here as a fractured collection of 
local struggles with various obstacles. It is no coincidence that many game 
interpretations distance themselves from actual gameplay34 and some games look for 
                                                          
33 see Arjoranta 2015. 
34 Leino 2012; Möring Sebastian, “Freedom in Games–Between Fear and Boredom.” Proceedings of 
the Philosophy of Computer Games (2013a), http://gamephilosophy2014.org/wp-
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a way to reduce the pervasiveness of the validation process, for example by reducing 
the number of obstacles to overcome, as “walking simulators” fashioned after Dear 
Esther (Chinese Room, 2012) do. As Michał Kłosiński claims, to employ a game as a 
way to understand the world and enrich oneself, it is necessary to move from 
gameness to narrativity.35 
 
Playing the Game My Way 
 
Privileging validation over other parts of the interpretative process leads to yet 
another effect. In simple games, with gameplay either straightforward or reduced 
merely to a background for the narrative (as was the case of adventure games), the 
validation is based solely on authorial intent. The player needs to guess the correct 
order of conduct and execute it accordingly. I cannot alter the course of The Secret of 
Monkey Island by—let us say—focusing on honing the navigation skill of Guybrush 
Threepwood instead of his swordsmanship. The only way to measure skill is time: a 
skilled player can beat the game more quickly. But there are titles that offer more 
than a single way to accomplish tasks. After ruling out everything impossible, they 
let the player decide how to proceed, sometimes allowing for astonishing creativity, 
like the famous employment of a gravity gun to power up jumps in Half-Life 2 (Valve 
2004). Even my Jason of Iolcos has a margin for freedom: he can ignore certain side 
quests, decide the order in which the four major parts of the plot are resolved, choose 
two out of four Argonauts as his companions during the adventure, and use different 
weapons in combat. Some of those choices are validated, other resisted. While 
playing, I was trying to simultaneously guess the best course of conduct as designed, 
and trim the game down to my personal taste, for example by reducing the amount 
of combat or helping out every miserable NPC on my way towards the Golden 
Fleece—searching for the balance between the idiosyncratic and the intersubjective.  
This freedom to choose, described as one of the definitive qualities of video games, 
has been recognized by Arjoranta and Kochanowicz as an opportunity for self-
reflection for players. As Arjoranta explains: “While all works of art have a chance 
to tell us something about ourselves, games, perhaps, excel in this. In order to play, 
the player must act, make choices, and see what kind of consequences those choices 
have, while the game evaluates some of those choices (…) Not all games support 
this equally, but again, ludonarrative games have the frameworks required to make 
ethical and existential questions meaningful”.36 
                                                          
content/uploads/2014/11/Sebastian-Moering-2014.-Freedom-in-Games_1st-draft.-
PCG2014.pdf, date accessed 23 September 2017. 
35 Kłosiński 2017, p. 67. 
36 Arjoranta 2015, p. 61. 
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I claim otherwise. By combining authorial intent with personal preference, the player 
seeks recognition for her hermeneutic skills: she wants to be recognized as both a 
good, obedient reader, keen to follow what the game narrative proposes, and as an 
innovator, bringing her unique style and ingenuity to the game. Simultaneously, the 
freedom to choose can be seen as a factor obscuring self-awareness, as the player is 
prone to repeating her choices in each and every game. For example, I always play as 
a good guy, trying to help the needy and seeking the best and most selfless solutions 
to moral dilemmas, regardless of the overall game aesthetics. Doing so, I am leaning 
towards the style Jaroslav Švelch called “honest moral gameplay”37. Given a choice, 
I actively avoid scenarios alien to my moral code; as a result, I dodge confrontation 
with disturbing situations which could lead me to better self-knowledge. To invoke 
moral impact, it is common for video games to limit their player’s choice—as Spec 
Ops: The Line (Yager Development 2012) does—or to obscure some elements of the 
narrative, diminishing the chance of proper interpretation, and therefore challenging 
the player’s ability to gain validation, which is the way of The Witcher (CD Projekt 
RED, 2007 and subsequent). Because of the focus on validation, video games 
preoccupy players with their own actions and their own hermeneutic skills, rather 
than creating a possibility for a meaningful interaction with text38. This seems to be 
a serious impediment on the road to a full Ricoeurian interpretation, a tool to 
transform oneself by interacting with the world of the text. 
But it does not mean that games are of less worth compared to literature, or that they 
are simply a feel-good medium unless they are heavily-loaded with literary or 
cinematic elements to make them less gamey. In a way, they even seem similar to 
postmodern meta-fiction, which combines traditional interpretative possibilities with 
the pleasure of recognizing intertextual references. Therefore, to understand the 
game-specific hermeneutic process, it is only reasonable to ask why validation is so 
important, and where the hermeneutic circle of guess and validation present within 
video games can lead us. One possible answer can be found in the concept of 
consolation—the quality Umberto Eco found essential to popular narrative39. In 
video games, consolation comes from the game reassuring the player that she is good 
at interpretation by measuring her skill and validating her guesses. In fact, games do 
it better than literature or cinema because they simultaneously leave no room for 
doubt while assuring the player of her authenticity: after all, it is her guess that gets 
validated, and her interpretative stance, carried from game to game, that matters.  
A description of a fairly similar process can be found in Charles Taylor’s analysis of 
sources for contemporary morality40. According to the Canadian philosopher, the 
                                                          
37 Švelch Jaroslav, “The Good, the Bad, and the Player: The Challenges to Moral Engagement in 
Single-Player Avatar-Based Video Games.” in Ethics and Game Design, edited by Karen Schrier and 
David Gibson (New York: Hershey) (2010). 
38 Ricoeur 2007. 
39 Eco, Umberto, Il Superuomo Di Massa: Retorica E Ideologia Nel Romanzo Popolare (Rome: 
Bompiani) (2012). 
40 Taylor 1992. 
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main source of rejecting normative ethics in favour of a self-constructed morality lies 
in the interaction between the strong sense of self—understood as an independent 
and unique way of being human—and the horizon of values established by the 
community. The first component, rooted in the Romantic notion of individuality, 
drives a person towards freedom to pursue happiness any way she chooses. But, 
according to Taylor, it does not necessarily result in a crumbling society of narcissistic 
egomaniacs, as there is an important precondition to pursuing personal goals: if one 
recognizes such an endeavour as her supreme right, one needs to give other members 
of her community the same right. Also, even if that person is free to choose personal 
beliefs, she “couldn't just decide that the most significant action is wiggling [her] toes 
in warm mud. Without a special explanation, this is not an intelligible claim41 and she 
has to measure the choice against the general convictions held by the community. 
Consequently, the ethics of authenticity can be perceived as result of the tension 
between individualism and the shared pool of values. This tension serves as the basis 
for both an individual interpretation of the world and community-generated 
recognition. In the example analysed by Taylor (the society of the United States in 
the late 1980s) the common denominator was instrumental rationality: one was 
allowed to pursue different goals as long as they were profitable and possible to 
explain. 
The analysis I summarize here very briefly and crudely seems strangely similar to the 
central mechanism of the video games I discussed earlier. The player is free to play 
however she likes, as long as it is in line with the game’s established set of values. 
Those are usually instrumental, as everything and everybody the protagonist 
encounters is useable, rational, and easily quantifiable. This remains true even for 
another human’s misery: every trouble of every NPC my Jason encountered on his 
path was an opportunity to gain some experience points and other rewards, as well 
as to get possible help in the main quest. Although seemingly noble and selfless, my 
protagonist always had one eye on the prize. The efficacy of a player’s interpretative 
guess is at least partially dependent on those values: for example, it is important to 
recognize a call for help as an opportunity to profit, and act accordingly. This way 
players’ effort can be validated, quantified, and rewarded, creating a common horizon 
of values for all users of the same game. Someone resisting this quantification, for 
reasons Sicart, Arjoranta and Švlech point out,42 is therefore either a quirky loner or 
a member of the community sharing his resistance, thus using values of the game as 
a negative point of reference in their common horizon43. The important factor of 
playing a game would therefore be connected to the larger issue of authenticity, as 
Taylor understands it: certain players need to use all their skills to understand and 
                                                          
41 Taylor 1992, p. 36. 
42 Sicart Miguel, The Ethics of Computer Games (Cambridge MA: MIT Press) (2009); Arjoranta 
2015; Švelch 2010. 
43 Westerlaken, Michelle. "Self-Fashioning in Action: Zelda’s Breath of the Wild Vegan Run." 
Proceedings of the Philosophy of Computer Games (2017), 
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execute the game in their own, particular way, which is measurable against efforts of 
different players, framed by overall moves permitted and considered meaningful by 
the game system. To put it more simply: to win, my Jason needs to eliminate hordes 
of enemies with either a sword, a spear, or a mace. And every Argonaut/player has 
the freedom to choose one of these tools, based on her understanding of the game 
mechanics, genre tradition, and knowledge of Apollonius of Rhodes or Robert 
Graves. Then, her efforts can be measured and compared with the efficiency of 
others. The one thing she cannot do is reject violence and search for a diplomatic 
solution: it is outside Rise of the Argonauts’ horizon of values. 
The analogy between the process of meaning making in video games and Tayloran 
ethics of authenticity is of course quite crude and needs deeper, more inquisitive 
development, which I have already attempted elsewhere44. Here, I use it solely to 
point out three possible consequences of hermeneutics that privilege validation over 
explanation. Firstly, even if Taylor’s observation from the late 1980s is no longer 
valid, his book was created in the same cultural climate that made the rise of video 
games possible. The connection, even if presented here in a slightly superficial 
manner, might explain the increasing importance of video games as a cultural form: 
in a way, they have become a model for good life, according to the ethics of 
authenticity. Therefore, the important cultural function of video games could be 
explained in terms of Roger Caillois’ classic observation: “It is not absurd to try 
diagnosing a civilization in terms of the games that are especially popular there. In 
fact, if games are cultural factors and images, it follows that to a certain degree a 
civilization and its content may be characterized by its games”.45  
Secondly, there is a severe difference between the ethics of Taylor and Ricoeur: the 
first scholar describes the relationship between the text and the self as an expression 
of the latter projected onto the former, based on an individual search for values. 
Ricoeur’s view is directly the opposite: there is no other way towards self-awareness 
but through searching for similarities within the text, and, in the presented case, by 
appropriating literature46. Video games as analysed here can serve as a case to support 
Taylor’s claim: confronted with an obstacle, the player uses her pre-established 
strategy of understanding, rooted in her confidence with skills and knowledge she 
already possesses. This way she reaffirms her strategy of being herself, instead of 
expanding her self-knowledge and transforming the self as a result of contact with 
the game text, as Ricoeur would postulate. This leads to the third conclusion: such a 
reassuring and culturally important way of experiencing narratives could possibly be 
                                                          
44 Majkowski, Tomasz Z. "Gry wideo i kultura autentyczności." in Homo Ludens 3:1 (2011); 
Majkowski Tomasz Z. „Gra wideo jako model dobrego życia” in Kultura Zabawy edited by 
Paleczny Tadeusz, Kantor Ryszard, Banaszkiewicz Magdalena (Kraków: Wydawnictwo UJ) 
(2012a). 
45 Caillois Roger, Man, Play, Games (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press) (1961), p. 83. 
46 Laitinen Arto, “Charles Taylor and Paul Ricoeur on Self-Interpretations and Narrative 
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of some importance to people playing video games. And, as it seems, it is. Self-
professed hardcore gamers tend to distance themselves from games they believe too 
easy or not game-like enough, as such games do not provide enough validation for 
their hermeneutic competence, in the way in which children’s rhymes do not satisfy 
people with a taste for T. S. Eliot. They also tend to resist attempts made to interpret 
video games in a more traditional fashion, by explaining their meaning and 
comprehending it: sometimes they even show hostility towards people with different 
hermeneutic strategies47. Such interpretative shenanigans threaten their sense of self, 
as measured against a rational and efficient scale of being skilful at playing 
mainstream video games.  
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